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Trade and agricultural pricing policies, along with public investments in irrigation and 
agricultural research and extensions, have played a crucial role in agricultural development of 
Pakistan.
1 From the 1960s through the mid-1980s, major government interventions in domestic 
agricultural markets, trade policies and controls on foreign exchange created large distortions to 
agricultural prices. In general, the total effects of these policies, including the indirect effects of 
trade policy distortions on real exchange rates, was to lower real prices of tradable agricultural 
products (Hamid, Nabi and Nasim 1990; Dorosh and Valdès 1990). In spite of the price 
disincentives, however, agricultural output rose rapidly due to adoption of the green revolution 
package of inputs (improved seed, fertilizer, irrigation), and the resultant increase in productivity 
(Ali and Byerlee 2002). Major investments in land and, most important in the Pakistan context, 
in water supply (particularly through tube wells) also allowed increases in net area sown.  
Substantial liberalization took place from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, however, 
greatly reducing explicit tariffs and taxes, as well as government direct interventions in markets 
for most agricultural products (Nabi 1997; Salam 2001; Ahmed 2003). Nonetheless, the 
government continues to intervene heavily in domestic wheat markets, and there remain 
significant tariffs on vegetable oils and milk products. This chapter describes these interventions 
and presents internally consistent estimates of nominal rates of assistance, as well as estimates of 
broader trade policy effects through real exchange rate distortions.  
The next section presents a brief overview of Pakistan’s agriculture, highlighting growth 
rates in area, yield and production for various crops. The following section describes key trade 
and pricing policies for the major crops over time, and presents measures of policy distortions 
                                                 
 
1 Throughout the chapter the data and policy analysis refer to the current territory of Pakistan, 
which prior to 1971 was West Pakistan. (In 1971, East Pakistan became the independent 




(nominal rates of assistance) over time. Then broader trade and exchange rate policies in 
Pakistan and estimates of indirect effects of those distortions on relative prices faced by 
agricultural producers are presented. The final section concludes with a discussion of the 
political economy context of Pakistan’s agricultural policies. 
 
 
Pakistan’s agricultural sector 
 
 
Although agriculture is the primary sector of employment for nearly half of the Pakistan’s 
national workforce, it contributes barely one-fifth of national GDP and only one-eighth of 
exports, even when processed foods are included. The decline in the relative importance of 
agriculture has been less rapid for Pakistan than for other South Asian countries except in terms 
of exports, whose share was more than half prior to the 1970s (Table 1). Agricultural earnings 
still account for about 70 percent of rural household incomes, however.  
Four crops (wheat, cotton, basmati and coarse rice, and sugar cane) account for two-
thirds of total cropped area and agricultural crop GDP and more than one-third of total 
agricultural GDP. Much of the focus of agricultural policy, research and extension has been on 
these crops, and adoption of green revolution technology of improved seeds, increased fertilizer 
use and irrigation (especially private tube wells that provided better water control) contributed to 
substantial increases in yields and production of wheat and rice in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Livestock, mainly dairy, but also poultry, sheep and goats, accounts for nearly half of 
agricultural GDP. The shares of gross value of agricultural production attributable to different 
products, when expressed at undistorted prices, are shown in Figure 1. 
Nearly 80 percent of cropped area is irrigated, and agriculture is by far the largest user of 
available water resources in the country, consuming on average about 95 percent of available 
water resources. Increases in water resource availability for irrigation and expansion of irrigated 
area have played a central role in agricultural growth since the 1960s. Total irrigated area 
increased by 80 percent between 1960 and 2005, from 10 to 19 million hectares, mainly due to  
3
an expansion in tube well irrigation.
2 In 2004, 37 percent of irrigated land was irrigated solely 
with canal water; 41 percent with canal and tube well water, and 18 percent solely with tube well 
water.  
Annual agricultural growth in Pakistan averaged 3.7 percent over the period 1959 to 
2001, although there were wide year-to-year variations. Apart from a period of slow growth in 
the first half of the 1970s, average agricultural growth exceeded 3.2 percent per year in each 
quinquennium from 1960 to 2000, due in large part to high growth in the crop sector in the 1970s 
and 1980s from Green Revolution technology (improved seeds, increased fertilizer use, and 
irrigation). However, the performance of the agriculture sector (particularly the crops sub-sector) 
has suffered in recent years because of severe droughts in the country, as well as environmental 
factors (increased soil salinity and deteriorating groundwater quality). Pakistan’s agricultural 
sector grew at a modest rate of only 2.6 percent per year from 1999 to 2005, however (0.5 
percent per year on a per capita basis). Real value added of the four major crops (wheat, basmati 
and other rice, cotton and sugarcane) grew by 2.6 percent per year over the period, with 
substantial fluctuations in recent years, while that of the livestock sector increased somewhat 
faster at 3.5 percent.  
Most of the increase in production of the major crops since the early 1990s has come 
from increased yields. For example, from 1990 to 2005, average annual growth rates in wheat 
and basmati rice area were 0.2 and 2.5 percent, respectively, while yields grew by 2.2 and 3.6 
percent, respectively (Table 2). Cotton yields, by contrast, stagnated over this period, increasing 
by only 0.8 percent per year (although 2004 was a bumper crop), and yields of sugar cane 
increased by only 0.9 percent per year. Maize has enjoyed a large expansion in both yields (4.7 




Trade and exchange rate policies 
 
 
                                                 
 
2 Throughout this chapter, crop or fiscal years are indicated by the second of the two calendar years (e.g., 2005 
refers to 2004/05).  
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Pakistan operated a fixed nominal exchange rate regime, with only the rate relative to the United 
States dollar changing from independence through to the early 1980s.
3 In the 1960s, the 
government operated various export bonus schemes that substantially raised the rupee price of 
foreign exchange for exporters. The official nominal exchange rate remained fixed throughout 
the 1960s until a major devaluation in 1971-72 when it was halved in US dollar terms. Domestic 
inflation coupled with a fixed nominal exchange rate steadily eroded export incentives (a real 
exchange rate appreciation) in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however. To restore incentives for 
export growth, the Zia government undertook a succession of nominal devaluations of the rupee 
(totaling 73 percent) from Rs/$ 9.90 to 17.2 between fiscal years 1981 and 1987 that achieved a 
real exchange rate depreciation of 65 percent.
4
Thereafter, there was little change in real exchange rates until 1996, when the nominal 
exchange rate was allowed to depreciate more rapidly. Between fiscal years 1996 and 2001, the 
nominal exchange rate depreciated by 74 percent from Rs/$ 33.6 to 58.4, although because of 
relatively high domestic inflation the real exchange rate depreciated by only 11 percent.  
Large inflows of foreign capital (both public and private) that began in late 2001 related 
to post-September 11 shifts in donor policies and repatriation of private sector capital to 
Pakistan. They contributed to an 8 percent appreciation of the real exchange rate from September 
2001 to October 2002. These capital inflows also helped Pakistan avoid a pending balance of 
payments crisis and increase public spending. Careful macro-management, including repayment 
of international debt, combined with a surge in public and private sector imports resulted in a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate in 2003 and 2004. More-recent trends, however, suggest 
that expansionary monetary and fiscal policy may have adversely affected incentives for tradable 
goods relative to nontradables, as the real exchange rate appreciated by 14 percent between 
December 2004 and November 2005.  
Prior to major reforms in 1991 and 1997, Pakistan generally followed an import 
substitution trade policy aimed at promoting the industrial sector. Trade taxes were also a major 
source of government revenue. Under the first Nawaz Sharif government (November 1990 to 
                                                 
 
3 See Hamid, Nabi and Nasim (1990) for a detailed discussion of Pakistan’s trade and exchange rate policies from 
the 1960s through the mid-1980s. 
4 According to economic theory, nominal devaluations, in themselves, cannot cause real exchange rate changes. 
However, these nominal devaluations also directly reduced the implicit tariff on imports due to quotas, a policy shift 
that does affect relative prices.  
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July 1993), tariff rates were cut sharply in 1991 and, as a result, net tariff revenues as a share of 
imports fell from 34 percent in 1990 to 27 percent in 1991. Unweighted average tariff rates fell 
from 77 percent in 1988 to only 45 percent in 1994. The number of items subject to quantitative 
restrictions also was reduced, from 1361 in 1988 to only 970 in 1993 – although nearly 10 
percent of all commodities were still subject to quantitative restrictions in 1993 (Nabi 1997, pp. 
144, 148). This trade reform was accompanied by liberalization of foreign exchange markets in 
1992, including permitting foreign currency bank deposits (Hasan 1998, p. 276).  
Six years later, in March 1997, under the second Nawaz Sharif government (February 
1997 to October 1999), the maximum tariff rate was reduced from 65 percent to 45 percent, the 
number of tariff slabs was reduced from 13 to 5, and there was a sharp reduction in tariff rates of 
smuggling-prone items to between 10 and 25 percent (Hasan 1998, p. 319). 
These changes in trade policy are reflected in net custom duties, which fell from an 
average of 34 percent in 1985-89 to 22 percent in 1990-96, and to an average of only 12 and 9 
percent in 1997-2000 and 2001-03, respectively. The decline in total taxes on imports has been 
far less dramatic, however, since as custom duties were lowered sales taxes on imports were 
raised. Thus, total taxes on imports declined by only 10 percent between 1990 and 2000, from 34 
percent to 24 percent.
5 Average statutory tariff rates were similar for agriculture and industrial 
products: 21.8 and 20.2 percent, respectively in 2001 (World Bank 2004, p. 44). 
Along with a reduction in tariff rates, trade liberalization in the 1990s included a gradual 
reduction in the number of products subject to quantitative restrictions. By 1997 only 2.7 percent 
of product lines were subject to traditional quantitative restrictions. The subsequent reforms 
begun in 1997 led to the elimination of essentially all remaining traditional quantitative 
restrictions and parastatal import monopolies by 2003, with the important exceptions of a ban on 
import of products not included in a positive list of 677 items, and local-content programs in the 
automobile industry (World Bank 2004, p. 22). 
The combined effect of import tariffs and quotas on domestic prices can be expressed as 
an implicit tariff rate, defined as the ratio of domestic prices (measured at the border) to import 
prices. In the absence of detailed data on domestic and import prices, we calculate estimates of 
                                                 
 
5 Note that to the extent that domestic goods also pay sales taxes, these import sales tax do not represent a trade 
policy distortion if they are in lieu of a sales tax on the imported products.   
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the implicit tariff, extending an earlier series by Dorosh and Valdès (1990) using the average 
percentage change in actual average tariff rates. The calculations suggest that trade liberalization 
in Pakistan reduced implicit tariffs sharply over time, from an average of 53 percent in 1985-89 
to an average of only 15 percent in 2001-03. Likewise, the effects of trade policy distortions on 





Impacts of agricultural price and trade policies on nominal rates of assistance 
 
 
We consider in this section the distortionary policies in place for milk and several key crop 
products — wheat, cotton, rice (basmati and IRRI), sugar and maize. Together these products 
account for around 70 percent of the value of agricultural production (Figure 1). In line with the 
project’s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008), we estimate nominal rates of assistance (NRA) on 
output for each of those products. Through careful comparisons of domestic prices with prices at 
the border or international reference prices, adjusted for quality differences, marketing margins 
and the dual exchange rate system,
7 these measures capture the proportional extent to which 
government-imposed distortions create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be 
under free markets.  
  
Wheat 
                                                 
 
6 Utilizing a value of the omega parameter of -0.41, the implicit appreciation of the rupee due to trade policy fell 
from 15 percent in 1985-89 to an average of only 5 percent in 2001-03. The omega parameter is defined as the 
percentage change in the real exchange rate divided by the percentage change in trade policy (which is measured as 
one plus the equivalent tariff adjusted for export taxes). The value of the omega parameter derives from an ordinary 
least squares estimate using monthly price and trade data from 1972 to 1987 (Dorosh and Valdès 1990). Co-
integration techniques were not utilized in that report, but a regression using first differences of variables resulted in 
a value of omega of -0.54. Note that black market premia are small for Pakistan after 1985, averaging 6.4 percent 
from 1985 to 1993, and 12.0 percent from 1996 to 1999. The real exchange rate appreciation due to trade policy, 
however, is conceptually different from a black market premium, which largely reflects controls on foreign 
exchange rather than explicit trade policies. See Anderson et al. (2008) for a discussion of this issue in the context of 
the present project. 
7 The NRAs for tradables include an estimate of the trade tax effect of the overvalued exchange rate. As outlined in 
the methodology, that estimate uses the black market exchange rate premium (see Easterly 2006) and assumes that 
only half of exporters’ foreign exchange rate earnings are sold to the government at the official rate. See Anderson 
et al. (2008) for details of this methodology.  
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Wheat is Pakistan’s main staple food, accounting for 1042 calories/person/day in 2001, or 42 
percent of total caloric consumption (2001 FAO).
8 Adoption of green revolution technology 
enabled Pakistan to more than double its wheat production from the early 1970s to the late 
1990s, and it has risen by a further one-quarter since then (Table 3).
9 Nonetheless, in most years 
since 1960 Pakistan has been a net wheat importer.  
 
Government wheat policy 
Government wheat policy in Pakistan attempts to balance competing interests of producers and 
consumers. On the production side, policy is aimed at increasing wheat productivity (yields) and 
output, as well as supporting farmer incomes. Increased wheat production has also been seen as 
part of an overall national food security strategy of reducing dependence on food imports. On the 
consumption side, the government has attempted to enhance household food security, 
particularly through ensuring availability of wheat flour at affordable prices and maintaining 
price stability. Food policy options are constrained, however, by overall fiscal constraints, as 
well as a desire to minimize fiscal subsidies on food. Moreover, the wheat procurement price has 
been seen as a major determinant of overall inflation because of its role as a wage good and an 
indicator of overall government price policy. Thus, wheat policy is to some degree constrained 
also by inflation targets and inflation policy.  
To achieve these objectives, the federal and provincial governments have employed 
various instruments. Domestic procurement quantities and prices are the major instruments for 
spurring domestic production and improving farmers’ incomes.
10 The national support price and 
procurement quantity targets are set at the federal level, in consultation with provincial 
governments, although the implementation of procurement policy is the responsibility of 
                                                 
 
8 HIES 2001 data show a slightly higher absolute figure (1052 calories/person/day), but a much higher caloric share 
(58 percent of 1819 calories/person/day). Rural consumption per capita is 42 percent higher than urban consumption 
per capita, at 10.3 versus 7.2 kg per month. 
9 Most wheat in Pakistan is harvested in March and April towards the end of the July to June fiscal year. In the 
discussion that follows, fiscal years are used unless otherwise noted, with production from the previous fiscal year 
used in calculating net availability for the current fiscal year. 
10 Provincial governments, particularly the government of Punjab (the largest province), intervene heavily in wheat 
markets. Government procurement averaged 4.0 million tons per year in 2002 and 2003, about 25 percent of 
production in these years. Punjab alone accounted for almost 90 percent of procurement, equivalent to 27 percent of 
its production.   
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provincial governments and PASSCO (Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Supplies 
Corporation).
11 Likewise, sales of government wheat, almost exclusively to flour mills on a 
quota basis, are largely the responsibility of provincial governments.
12
Provincial governments have generally set procurement targets aimed at securing enough 
grain for planned distribution and stock build-up. Restrictions on the transport of wheat were 
widely used until the mid-1990s to help ensure that district officials of the provincial 
Departments of Food were able to meet their procurement targets. Marketing of wheat was 
subsequently liberalized, but in 2004 the Punjab government re-imposed restrictions on transport 
of wheat in an effort to meet procurement targets – and then removed them once again in 2005. 
Imports of wheat, undertaken by the federal government, have been used to supplement 
provincial food stocks and enable sufficient wheat sales to keep domestic price levels from rising 
too high. The government (and private sector contractors) also exported wheat in the 2000-03 
May-April marketing years following record levels of production and procurement in 2000.
13  
 
Effects of government policy on domestic wheat prices 
Despite the objective of boosting wheat production and self sufficiency, Pakistan’s trade and 
pricing policies have consistently taxed wheat producers and subsidized consumers relative to 
world prices. The mechanisms and levels of taxation have changed over time. In the 1960s wheat 
procurement prices were on average two-thirds higher than border prices measured using the 
official exchange rate.
14 Taking into account the distortions in the foreign exchange market 
brought about by the two-tiered exchange rate system, however, brings the average nominal rate 
of assistance to wheat producers down to just below zero for 1962-69. Thus, in this period 
                                                 
 
11 PASSCO supplies wheat to food deficit provinces, Northern Areas, Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and the 
defense establishment. 
12 Substantial wheat market liberalization took place in the late 1980s with the abolition of wheat ration shops and 
liberalization of private wheat imports (which were subsequently disallowed).  
13 There are major fiscal subsidies and economic rents involved in the sale of wheat to flour mills at below-market 
rates. Wheat issue prices (the price of wheat sales to flour mills) do not cover the full cost of procurement (domestic 
or imported), storage and handling. Provincial food subsidies in 2002 reached Rs 6.8 bn. This subsidy was 12 
percent greater than total Public Sector Development Program budget for the Health Division in 2004 (Rs 6.05 bn). 
Subsidies on sales of imported wheat accounted for another Rs 1.2 billion in that year. See Dorosh and Salam 
(2008). 
14 Nominal rates of protection are calculated assuming that Karachi serves as the central market for wheat, i.e. that in 
the absence of distortions, wheat imports would not reach northern Pakistan (Punjab). See the Appendix for details 
of the calculations of border prices.   
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exchange rate policy fully offset the impact of high nominal domestic procurement policies, 
although less than fully in the latter 1960s, and less than in the early 1960s (Table 4). 
During the 1970s, domestic prices were kept on average almost one-fifth below border 
prices (measured at equilibrium exchange rates) through large scale government imports, as net 
injections (releases minus domestic procurement) average 12 percent of total net availability 
(Table 3).
15 Nonetheless, nominal rates of protection fluctuated widely from year to year during 
this period. Massive distortions in the foreign exchange rate market (and high NRAs for wheat) 
continued until a sharp devaluation in late 1972 following the secession of East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) the previous year. During the 1972-74 period, when world prices of wheat and 
other grains rose sharply, Pakistan effectively insulated its domestic wheat market from that 
shock through government imports and subsidized sales. The implicit tax on wheat farmers 
peaked at 70 percent in 1973, but during the remainder of the 1970s as world prices fell and 
Pakistan wheat policy maintained real domestic wheat prices at approximately constant levels, 
the NRAs became much less negative (Appendix Table A1).  
Government net injections in wheat markets were substantially smaller in the 1980s, 
averaging only 2.7 percent of net availability. During that decade wheat NRAs averaged -22 
percent. Then policy reforms during the 1990s reduced exchange rate distortions to low level, but 
government net market interventions rose again to an average of 12.4 percent of net availability. 
As a result, domestic prices were depressed slightly more below border prices, with the NRA 
averaging -24 percent.  
Pakistan briefly became a net exporter of wheat following a bumper harvest in early 
2000. Because world market prices were lower than domestic prices, these exports required 
government subsidies. Government domestic procurement was greater than sales by a total of 
3000 kt and 660 kt in 2000 and 2001, respectively. Without these interventions, domestic prices 
would have been about one-tenth lower in 2000 and 2001. From 2002 through 2004, net 
government injections averaged 929 kt per year, about 5.2 percent of net availability (about half 
                                                 
 
15 These calculations assume that private sector imports and exports were zero, except in 2005, which includes an 
estimated 1.0 million tons of private sector imports. The data on wheat availability in Table 3 indicate an excess of 
net imports over net injections. This gap, equal to 453 thousand tons per year in 1981-1990, 321 thousand tons per 
year in 1991-2000, and 204 thousand tons in 2001-06, reflects private sector net imports, storage losses and public 
stock changes (as well as possible discrepancies across data sources).   
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of the share of net availability in the 1990s). As in most of the 1990s, prices were again below 
import parity levels (by 23 percent). 
In 2005, the government allowed private wheat imports, which totaled about 1 million 
tons for the year, keeping wholesale prices in Karachi close to import parity levels. Because 
release prices of wheat were about the same or higher than market prices in late 2005 and early 
2006 in parts of Punjab and Sindh, total government sales to flour mills were less than normal, 
resulting in a build-up of year-end stocks and net market withdrawals of about 1.8 million tons 
(10 percent of net availability), similar to the average levels of 2000 and 2001 (Dorosh and 
Salam 2008).  
Thus, government wheat policy has helped to stabilize prices as policy interventions have 
adjusted to changing market conditions, albeit at well below border prices despite this being an 
import-competing product. Large-scale subsidized import sales in years of high world prices 
(particularly the early 1970s and much of the 1990s) reduced prices to the benefit of consumers. 
In years of very good harvests (a less frequent occurrence -- several years of the 1980s, 2000 and 
2001) net market withdrawals kept domestic prices from falling steeply, thereby protecting 




Cotton, the largest cash crop of Pakistan, is second only to wheat in terms of area sown. Area 
under cotton has averaged around 3 million hectares, accounting for 15 per cent of the total 
cropped area annually, and for about one-quarter of the value added by major crops. Domestic 
cotton is also a major input into Pakistan’s textile industry. The cotton industry also contributes 
to export earnings indirectly in that various cotton products (cotton lint, yarn, cloth and 
garments) account for about two-thirds of the value of Pakistan’s merchandise exports.
16
As the textile industry has expanded over time in Pakistan, exports of raw cotton have 
declined and an increasingly large proportion of cotton is processed domestically into yarn. 
Pakistan’s raw cotton (lint) exports dropped from an annual average of 414 thousand tons (kt) in 
the 1980s to only 161 kt in the 1990s and 72 kt in 2000-05. At the same time, Pakistan has 
                                                 
 
16 However, Pakistan also imports some cotton and synthetic yarn, cloth and garments.  
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imported substantial volumes of lint cotton, so that net exports in lint cotton has gone from on 
annual average of 408 kt in the 1980s to -205 kt (net imports) during 2001-05 (Table 5). Imports 
of cotton lint are mainly high-grade longer staple cottons. 
To help ensure adequate incomes for cotton farmers, the government began announcing 
support prices for cotton lint and seed cotton (phutti) in 1975. The mechanism by which the 
government attempted to actually influence market prices changed substantially over this period, 
however, and support prices for cotton lint were discontinued after 1995.  
From 1974 through 1986, the Cotton Export Corporation (CEC), established in the early 
1970s, had a monopoly on cotton (lint) exports. By restricting the volume of exports, the CEC 
suppressed domestic prices of cotton below world price levels. At official exchange rates, the 
nominal rates of assistance on cotton lint averaged -12 and -9 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, 
respectively. Cotton producers benefited, however, from trade protection for vegetable oils that 
boosted domestic prices of cotton seed, which averaged approximately one-quarter of the value 
of seed cotton (phuti) during 2000-04. Including the protection on cotton seed, the total nominal 
rates of assistance for cotton farmers was less negative. But when the dual exchange rate system 
is taken into account, the average NRA for cotton becomes -18 percent in the 1960s, -6 percent 
in the 1970s and -2 percent in the 1980s (Table 4).  
Beginning in 1986 and continuing through 1993, export taxes on cotton were calculated 
as a fixed percentage of the margin between the benchmark price (the target ex gin price of lint 
plus export incidentals) and the minimum export price (fixed daily by the Inter Agency 
Committee and announced by the State Bank of Pakistan, and based on the international prices of 
lint, domestic prices of yarn and lint, domestic requirements of the industry and the global and 
local supply situation).
17 The tax rate on this margin, as well as the benchmark price, were 
adjusted frequently, however, as the government attempted to maximize export tax receipts as 
well as to ensure low prices for the domestic yarn and textile industries.
18 This system of variable 
export taxes effectively insulated the domestic market from movements in international prices. 
Nonetheless, under-invoicing of cotton exports continued through shipments of grades higher 
than the declared grades.  
                                                 
 
17 This system was designed to correct a problem of under-invoicing that had lowered export tax receipts.  
18 Private sector exports were allowed again beginning in 1987, but initially the cotton lint had to be purchased from 
the CEC. In 1988 exporters were allowed to buy cotton from the ginners directly.   
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Poor domestic harvests of cotton in 1993 and 1994 made Pakistan a net importer of 
cotton, with imports of about 100 kt each year. The increasing imports and dwindling availability 
of cotton for exports brought into focus the demerits of the bench mark system which had 
heavily taxed the cotton farmers but provided cheap raw material to the textile industry and 
encouraged inefficiency in the textile sector. There was great resentment among the farmers 
against the system who demanded its abolition. As a result, the export duty on cotton was 
abolished in 1994 and domestic prices since the 1994 cotton season have been in line with the 
international prices and even higher in some years.  
Since 1994, demand for lint in the textile sector has continued to outpace supply, and 
Pakistan has been a net importer of cotton lint in most recent years, with gross imports averaging 
259 kt per year during 2000-04. Moreover, in spite of the end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement 
(MFA) at the end of 2004, Pakistan’s textile sector has continued to flourish, with imports of lint 
for 2005 approximating the levels in each of the previous two years (about 400 kt).  
Duties on both exports and imports of cotton have been very low since the mid-1990s, 
and direct market interventions have likewise been minimal, except in 2004 when the Trading 
Corporation of Pakistan bought 270 kt of cotton (11 percent of production) in an effort to boost 
domestic prices.
19 Annual price movements, however, suggest that domestic prices of seed 
cotton are essentially determined by world prices of cotton lint and the domestic price of cotton 
seed (Orden et al. 2005). In this case, attempts to stabilize prices through procurement are 
unlikely to have a major effect on prices unless external trade is restricted.  
Thus, trade policy distortions in domestic markets for cotton lint are minimal, though 
seed cotton enjoys some protection because of import tariffs on vegetable oils that boost the 
price of cotton seed oil. Using domestic prices of cotton seed in the calculations, the estimated 
average nominal rate of protection for 2000-05 for seed cotton is only 4 percent at export 
parity.
20 The protection provided to cotton seed oil, however, raises the nominal rate of 
protection for seed cotton by about 3 percentage points to a total of 7 percent at export parity for 
lint in the same period (Table 4).  
                                                 
 
19 The Trading Corporation of Pakistan (TCP) also procured 35 kt (2 percent of production) in 2001 to support 
prices. 
20 The import parity price is calculated on the basis of the Liverpool Cotton Price Index B; the export parity price 
uses Pakistan’s actual average export prices of lint.  
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Basmati and IRRI rice 
 
Rice is the third largest crop of Pakistan after wheat and cotton, accounting for 19 percent of area 
planted to food grains, with an average production of around 5 million tons. Two major varieties 
of rice are produced in Pakistan: long grain, aromatic “basmati” rice and ordinary coarse rice 
(often and in this chapter termed “IRRI” rice). Both varieties are exported, with basmati rice 
exports accounting for about 35 percent (780 thousand tons per year) of total rice exports of 2.2 
million tons per year in recent years.  
Pakistan has exported substantial quantities of basmati rice following the large increase in 
world oil prices in the early 1970s which led to a surge in Middle East demand for rice imports. 
The Bhutto government, which also nationalized many domestic industries (including rice 
milling in 1976), set up the Rice Export Corporation as a state monopoly.
21 Under the 
assumption that elasticities of domestic supply and international demand were low, the 
government set a low procurement price. To keep domestic consumption low (and export 
volumes high), the government also instituted a monopoly procurement scheme with only 
limited domestic sales.  Nominal rates of assistance estimates for basmati paddy suggest that, 
during both the 1960s and 1970s, farmers received barely half what they would have under free 
markets (Table 4).
22
Following the coup by General Zia in July 1977, rice mills were returned to the private 
sector and basmati rice marketing was gradually liberalized. From 1977 to 1987, provincial food 
departments still retained considerable influence in domestic markets through the annual 
“Monopoly Procurement Scheme” for basmati rice. That scheme set licensing rules, restrictions 
on movement of rice across district boundaries and quotas to dealers for sales in domestic 
markets. Traders were allowed to sell 20 percent of the amount delivered to procurement center 
in domestic markets; the remainder was exported. As a result of these restrictions on domestic 
supply, consumer prices were substantially above procurement prices. Compulsory procurement 
                                                 
 
21 This history of the rice sector through 1987 is based on Hamid, Nabi and Nasim (1990). 
22 Calculations of border prices by the Agricultural Prices Commission use a very large transport and processing cost 
for basmati rice from Punjab to Karachi (the export port) of Rs 4650/ton, about twice the total of import incidentals 
and transport of wheat from Karachi to the procurement center in Punjab, (Rs 2542/ton), or the costs for export of 
IRRI rice (2300 Rs/ton). Because of these high marketing margins, APCOM’s calculated border prices of basmati 
rice at farm-gate are market prices.  
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was abandoned in the 1986 harvest season, limited private sector exports were allowed, and 
procurement prices were raised. The system of voluntary procurement at the announced support 
price of paddy continued through to 2001.   
Over 60 percent of the IRRI rice produced in Pakistan is produced in Sindh, where it is 
also a staple food. Government policies for IRRI rice also included announced support prices and 
domestic procurement, although in the 1970s and 1980s, the Rice Export Corporation did not 
procure IRRI rice in Punjab because the higher transport costs (relative to Sindh, the center of 
procurement) made exports of Punjab rice unprofitable. Nominal rates of assistance for IRRI 
rice, calculated on the basis of world rice prices,
23 show producer taxation in the 1980s of just 
over one-fifth but its gradual disappearance since then. Beginning in 2003, the government has 
been announcing indicative prices for paddy, but procurement has been minimal. Currently, no 
export tax is levied on rice, and imports are subject to a 10 percent customs duty. This is 




Sugarcane, cultivated exclusively on irrigated land in Pakistan, accounts for 4-5 percent of the 22 
million cropped hectares per year in the country. About half of the area under sugarcane comes 
from farms operating less than 5 hectares. The geographical distribution of its production follows 
a similar pattern as for other irrigated crops, with two-thirds of the crop cultivated in Punjab and 
about one-fourth in Sindh. The area planted to sugarcane cultivation increased by 61 percent 
between 1979 and 1999 and, along with it, the number of sugar mills, from 32 in 1980 to 79 in 
2005, all of which are now in the private sector. Crop production is highly variable due to both 
fluctuations in water availability that influence area and yield, and to changing price incentives. 
Sugarcane production in Punjab has ranged from 19 to 34 million tons, and in Sindh from 9 to 17 
million tons during the period 1979-2005. To stabilize prices in the wake of these fluctuations in 
production, the government frequently adjusts import tariffs (set at 15 percent in 2005) and 
related taxes on sugar, and has even placed export bans.  
                                                 
 
23 Using fob Bangkok, White Milled 5 percent broken rice (IFS 57876n7M81) and a 0.71 quality adjustment factor 
(equal to the average ratio of the average price of Pakistan Non-basmati rice exports to the fob Bangkok price for the 
1974-79 period.   
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In addition to restrictions and taxes on trade, domestic marketing and processing of sugar 
cane were highly regulated until the mid-1980s. Zoning of sugar mills, which required farmers to 
sell 80 percent of their sugarcane to the mill located in their zones, was abolished in 1987, 
freeing farmers to sell their sugarcane to whichever mill they preferred. Until 2000, the federal 
government annually announced the support price of sugarcane, but since then support prices 
have been decided by provincial governments. However, there is no institutional arrangement for 
public sector procurement of sugarcane when sugar mills do not pay farmers the full support 
price.
24  
Given the wide variation in domestic production as well as world prices, Pakistan’s 
domestic sugar prices and measured NRAs have fluctuated greatly. In general, though, sugarcane 
and refined sugar production have been highly protected in Pakistan. Nominal rates of assistance 
averaged over 100 percent in the 1960s and early 1970, and again in the latter 1980s when 





Maize is counted as a major crop in Pakistan, although it is sown on an area of only about just 
under one million hectares (one-eighth that of wheat). Production averaged 2.1 million tons per 
year in 2002-04, or 8 percent of total grain production. Maize is cultivated on both irrigated and 
non-irrigated land, mainly in NWFP (57 percent of maize area) and Punjab (41 percent of maize 
area). The area cultivated expanded by an average of 1.0 percent per year from 1989 to 2005 
when adoption of hybrid maize planted in the spring on irrigated land contributed to a 4.7 
percent per year growth in yields. Most maize in Pakistan is used as livestock and poultry feed, 
which has expanded rapidly along with domestic demand for poultry products.  
Apart from import duties that ranged from 10 to 25 percent since the mid-1990s, the 
government has not intervened in maize production and marketing. Often maize has been a 
nontradable good since the 1980s, with domestic prices below import parity levels (even without 
the import tariffs) but above export parity levels. Thus, the protection from import competition 
                                                 
 
24 In some years, sugarcane commissioners of provincial governments put pressure on mills to try to force them to 
pay farmers the support price.  
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provided by tariffs has had little effect on domestic prices, and the maize NRA has been close to 




In order to protect the domestic dairy industry, Pakistan has consistently levied import tariffs on 
imported milk powder. Nominal rates of assistance arising from these tariffs averaged above 70 
percent in the 1960s and 1970s.
25 Tariff rates for milk powder were lowered in the early 1990s 
and have ranged from 20 to 45 percent since the mid-1990s, resulting in a nominal rate of 
assistance averaging 40 percent in the 1990s and 20 percent from 2000 through 2005. The 
contrast between this high level of assistance to dairying, along with that for sugar, and the much 
lower and usually negative NRAs for the other covered products, can be seen in Figure 3.  
 
Edible oils and oilseeds 
 
Pakistan meets over two-thirds of its edible oil requirements from imports, which have risen 
sharply in recent years, from 1.1 million tons in 2000 to 1.6 million tons in 2004. In value terms, 
imports of edible oils in this period have more than doubled, from $326 million to $758 million. 
Traditional sources of domestic edible oil production have been cotton seed, a by-product of 
cotton farming, and rapeseed and mustard.
26 The area under rapeseed and mustard, sown in 
winter, has averaged at 273 thousand hectares in recent years. Sunflower and soybean were 
introduced in Pakistan in the 1980s and promoted through various development schemes and 
policy measures, including fixation of attractive support prices to encourage production and 
procurement by the public sector agencies to facilitate marketing of the produce. The area 
planted to sunflower has increased rapidly in recent years, especially in southern Punjab and 
lower Sindh, from a total of 108 thousand hectares in 2002 to 264 thousand hectares in 2004.
27   
                                                 
 
25 These rates were estimated using the unit import value of dry skim milk, adjusted by a conversion ration of 1:8 
and a quality factor of 90 percent, following Dorosh and Valdès (1990). 
26 Other minor oilseed crops grown in Pakistan include groundnut, safflower sesamum, canola (an improved cultivar 
of rapeseed and mustard) and linseed.  
27 Soybean remains a very minor crop: its area has been steady at around only 220 hectares.  
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There was little direct taxation of imported vegetable oils in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
exchange rate distortions led to an implicit subsidy on imports (and taxation of domestic 
producers) of just  3 percent in the 1970s and nothing in the 1980s. Since the early 1990s, 
however, vegetable oils have been consistently taxed in Pakistan. For example, from 2000 
through 2005, import tariffs on soybean oil were Rs 9050/ton, which was equivalent to an 
average of 32 percent of the import value (using the average price of Pakistan imports for each 
year). Import tariffs on palm oil were equivalent to about 40 percent of the import value. 
Likewise, except for three years in which world prices were relatively high (1994, 1995 and 
1997), domestic prices of sunflower have been substantially higher than estimated border prices. 
NRAs are not calculated for these products though because edible oils as a group constitutes a 
tiny fraction of the value of Pakistan’s agricultural production. 
 
Distortions to input prices 
 
The major distortion to non-factor input prices in agriculture in Pakistan has been the subsidy on 
nitrogenous fertilizer.
28 Domestic producer prices of mainly urea have been kept consistently 
below import parity border prices. This has been achieved by using domestic natural gas inputs 
in domestic fertilizer production and passing some of the savings to farmers through a discounted 
price. Since the early 1990s, there has been little or no subsidy on di-ammonium phosphate 
(DAP) and other major fertilizers, which are mainly imported, but not produced domestically. 
Domestic prices of both urea and DAP averaged between 30 to 45 percent below import 
parity in the later 1970s and the 1980s. From 1990 to 2005, however, domestic prices of DAP 
were on average only 4 percent below import parity prices, while prices of urea were 38 percent 
below border prices. 
Costs of urea and DAP were 8 and 10 percent, respectively, of the value of wheat 
production according to APCOM estimates for 2002. This implicit subsidy on fertilizer was 
equivalent to about 3 percent (0.08 * 0.38) of the value of wheat production from 1990 to 2005. 
                                                 
 
28 Surface irrigation water is also implicitly subsidized as water charges (abiana) are insufficient to cover the cost of 
maintenance of dam, canals and other water channels. Measurement of the economic value of these subsidies 
involves assessment of overall investment and maintenance costs, as well as problems attributing these costs to 
various crops, and so is not attempted in this study.  
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Thus, the NRA for wheat should be inflated by about 3 percentage points in this period. For the 
late 1970s and the 1980s when DAP was subsidized as well, the NRAs for wheat should be about 
7 percentage points (0.18 * 0.40) higher. NRAs for paddy, cotton and sugarcane are also 
understated by similar amounts in the two periods. These calculations are rather imprecise, and 
do not include water subsidies, but are nonetheless added to the NRA time series for the various 
crops for completeness and because they are non-trivial. 
 
 
Assistance to producers of agricultural relative to non-agricultural tradables 
 
 
A weighted average of the above NRA estimates has been obtained using the values of 
production at undistorted prices as weights. This is provided in Table 4, along with separate 
averages for import-competing and exportable subsectors. Those averages show that, prior to the 
devaluation in 1972, the nominal assistance provided to import-competing farmers more than 
outweighed the implicit taxation of exporters. In the following 20 plus years, however, import 
subsidies for wheat and less import protection for sugar meant the NRA for the import-
competing sub-sector fell to near zero so, with exportables still being implicitly taxed by 
between 20 and 30 percent, the NRA for all covered products averaged slightly below zero. And 
over the past dozen years it has averaged very close to zero (Figure 4 and Table 4). 
  Another consequence of the above set of NRA changes has been a considerable decline in 
the dispersion of product NRAs around their mean value each year. One measure of that, shown 
near the bottom of Table 4, is the standard deviation of those NRAs: it has fallen from more than 
100 percent in the latter 1960s to less than 60 percent in the 1970s and 1980s and to closer to 30 
percent in the past 15 years. This convergence in NRAs, which can be seen in Figure 3, suggests 
there would now be a more efficient allocation of land and other farm resources among those 
covered industries than in earlier decades. 
  The covered products account for as much as 70 percent of the value of Pakistan’s 
agricultural output at undistorted prices. Most of the country’s other farm products are 
nontradable or are not subject to interventions that significantly affect price incentives, so their 
average NRA is assumed to be zero. That brings down the weighted average NRA for the sector  
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as a whole relative to that for just the covered products, to rates a little closer to zero. This is 
shown in row 5 of Table 6, assuming the average rate of non-product-specific assistance to 
farmers is zero. 
  One final indicator worth mentioning in that table is the trade bias index. This captures 
the extent to which the NRA averages differ as between agriculture’s import-competing and 
exporting sub-sectors. That indicator (row 6 of Table 6) makes clear that the very considerable 
degree of anti-trade bias in the industry pattern of assistance in the past – notwithstanding the 
implicit import subsidies for wheat – has been greatly diminished over the past 15 years. Given 
that trade openness tends to enhance productivity growth, this trend too adds to the prospect for 
the sector to contribute more to the country’s prosperity. 
  What is also important to agriculture’s competitiveness within the economy and ability to 
contribute to it is the extent to which non-agricultural tradable sectors are assisted by government 
policies. As mentioned earlier, the combined effect of import tariffs and quotas on domestic 
prices of non-farm goods can be expressed as an implicit tariff rate, defined as the ratio of 
domestic prices (measured at the border) to import prices. In the absence of detailed data on 
domestic and import prices, we calculate estimates of that implicit tariff, extending backward 
and forward an earlier series by Dorosh and Valdès (1990) using the average percentage change 
in actual average tariff-equivalent rates.
29 The calculations can provide a NRA for import-
competing parts of the non-farm sector. When combined with an assumed NRA of zero for the 
exportable part of that sector, a production-weighted average NRA for non-agricultural tradables 
is generated. Crude though this is, it provides a reasonable measure that can be compared with 
the NRA for tradable agriculture using the relative rate of assistance (RRA) concept. As defined 
in the footnote to Table 6, the RRA shows the extent to which prices received by farmers are 
depressed relative to prices faced by producers of other tradables in the country. 
  The middle rows of Table 6 summarize the RRA findings, with annual estimates reported 
in Appendix Table A2. The NRAs for non-farm sectors is clearly very large in the pre-1972 
period of a highly overvalued currency, with the dual exchange rate system generating very high 
                                                 
 
29 Dorosh and Valdès (1990) estimate an equivalent tariff of 47 percent in 1986 based on changes in relative price 
indices and a base estimate of the equivalent tariff in 1980 of 55.0 percent, from Naqvi and Kemal (1983). The 
calculations use the change in tariff rates as an index of the overall implicit tariff change (instead of price indices), to 
extend the (1+tm)/(1-tx) series reported in Dorosh and Valdès (1990, Table 9), since tx was zero for that year (see 
Dorosh and Valdès 1990, Table 28).   
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level of protection for the import-competing manufacturing sector. That NRA came down 
sharply following the devaluation in 1972, remained reasonably steady for more than a decade, 
and then from the late 1980s fell steadily and in recent years has averaged less than 10 percent. 
Thus even though agriculture enjoyed a high positive NRA pre-1972, it was far smaller than the 
average NRA for non-farm activities and so resources were being attracted away from farming: 
the price of farm goods relative to those for non-farm goods averaged almost 60 percent below 
what it would have been under free markets. Following the 1972 devaluation the degree of anti-
agricultural bias diminished somewhat, but the RRA still averaged about -35 percent through to 
the early 1990s. Only after that did it begin to fall, significantly, and since the late 1990s it has 
averaged less than -10 percent (Figure 5). So an anti-agricultural bias remains, but it is very 
small relative to what prevailed in the previous two decades and especially in the two decades 
before that prior to the secession of East Pakistan (Bangladesh). 
  Finally in Table 6, we report how the estimated NRA, RRA and trade bias index for 
agriculture would differ if we had not taken into account the fact that a dual exchange rate added 
to the anti-trade bias. A comparison of them with the numbers above suggests that we would 
have overstated the degree of both direct and indirect taxation of agriculture, especially in the 




Political economy and conclusions 
 
 
Pakistan has a long history of intervening in agricultural product markets to influence prices, 
production and total supply. For major food commodities, particularly wheat, consumer interests 
have tended to outweigh producer interests in policy determination, and domestic prices have 
generally been kept below free trade levels. For cotton, industrialists in the spinning, weaving 
and clothing industries benefited from policies to keep domestic prices of the raw material low. 
Producers of rice, a major export, were also taxed until the mid-1990s, either through restrictions 
on sales or explicit export taxes and controls. Among major commodities, only for milk (and 
vegetable oils) have producers consistently gained from government trade and pricing policies  
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(mainly import tariffs). Offsetting the negative effects on output prices to some extent, however, 
have been implicit subsidies on canal water (irrigation fees less than the maintenance costs of 
canals), on electricity and fuel for pumps, on fertilizer, and on credit for purchase of tractors.  
Competing interests and relative strengths of various groups of stakeholders help explain 
these diverse policies. In the case of wheat, for example, farmers, particularly those with net 
sales, benefit from increases in procurement prices and quantities.
30 Flour millers gain from low 
issue (sales) prices of wheat that are typically below open market prices. Low market prices for 
wheat and wheat flour benefit net buyers of this staple, who account for about 80 percent of 
Pakistan’s population. Provincial food departments make great efforts to achieve domestic 
procurement targets which provide most of the grain for subsequent distribution. Large-scale 
procurement creates, and subsidized sales also create, the possibility of substantial economic 
rents. Sales of grain (at the issue price) from the surplus provinces (typically Punjab) to other 
provincial food departments involve an implicit cross-subsidization to the receiving provinces 
since issue prices do not cover the full costs of procurement, storage and distribution. The 
provincial and federal governments are also concerned with minimizing fiscal subsidies and 
overall inflation. Finally, donors have generally pushed for reductions in food subsidies and an 
increased role of the private sector in wheat marketing. 
For cotton and sugarcane, agricultural processors have an even stronger influence on 
policies. Industrialists in the spinning, weaving and clothing industries have a dominant voice in 
cotton policy debates because of the importance of these sectors in terms of value added, 
employment and foreign exchange earnings. Sugar millers are in a stronger position than are 
processors of most other crops because the perishability of the input (the yield of sugar 
(rendement) produced from harvested sugar cane drops sharply within days of harvest), and the 
high transport cost limit competition across sugar mills. Consequently, relations between the 
farmers and sugar mills have been tenuous at best, which has adversely impacted the 
development of sugarcane and related sub-sectors. In spite of the opposing interests of processors 
                                                 
 
30 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) 2001-02 data also indicate that wheat sales are highly concentrated. 
The top 10 percent of wheat farmers in terms of sales account for 47 percent of total wheat sales; the top 20 percent 
of wheat farmers in terms of sales (only 5 percent of Pakistan’s households) account for 67 percent of total wheat 
sales. Overall, only 20 percent of Pakistan’s households have a surplus of wheat production over home consumption, 
and 23 percent of wheat farmers are net wheat purchasers. (Net purchases are calculated on the basis of household 
production and an assumed per capita consumption of 140 kgs/person/year.)  
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and consumers noted above, however, Pakistan’s farmers have more political power to defend 
their interests than farmers in many developing countries with more equal distributions of land. 
This is because the presence of many large farmers gives the agricultural sector a stronger voice 
in the political debate.   
Nonetheless, in spite of the competing interests and producers and consumers, macro-
economic considerations, the demonstration effect of broad trade liberalization in other 
countries, and pressure from donors have resulted in a general reduction in the level of 
government interventions and the extent of policy-induced agricultural price distortions since the 
1970s. During the 1970s, the Bhutto government nationalized major industries and set up 
agricultural marketing institutions that played a major role in agricultural markets for wheat, 
cotton, rice and sugarcane. Broad trade and macro-policy reforms in the mid-1980s reduced 
overall import protection in Pakistan, both directly and via exchange rate distortions. Price 
distortions were substantially reduced, but the agricultural marketing institutions of the 1970s 
were left in place. Reforms in the 1990s were deeper in the sense that government direct 
interventions in markets (buying and selling of commodities) was dramatically reduced for 
cotton and rice, the Rice Export Corporation of Pakistan and the Cotton Export Corporation were 
abolished, and private sector involvement in external trade was generally encouraged. Trade 
distortions were reduced overall, as well as for agricultural products. Since 2000, price 
distortions in Pakistan’s agricultural markets have remained relatively small. However, the 
government continues to intervene heavily in wheat markets in ways that incur significant costs 
but that in general have had little effect on market prices, although the purchasing following the 
bumper wheat harvest of 2000 is an exception. The government also re-entered the cotton market 
following the bumper cotton crop in 2004. 
Pakistan’s agricultural and trade policies are far more liberalized now than thirty years 
ago, and price distortions across sectors are generally small. Even so, pressure from various 
stakeholders continues to influence government policy decisions to intervene directly in markets 
for the main farm products, particularly in years of bumper harvests that threaten to dramatically 
reduce producer prices or situations of supply shortfalls of key consumer goods (e.g. wheat and 
sugar). Maintaining consistent and transparent policies is thus crucial for further improvements 
in market efficiency. Overall, price distortions are no longer a major constraint to agricultural  
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growth and real incomes of farmers in Pakistan, but the sector could contribute more to 
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Figure 1: Shares of covered products in value of agricultural production at undistored prices, 

















































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Source: Authors’ spreadsheet. 
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Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all agricultural 
























































































Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
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Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to all non-agricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance,





























































































t are the percentage NRAs for the tradable parts of the agricultural and non-












 1965-69  1975-79  1985-89  2000-04  
Share of employment       
Pakistan  55  53  49  45  
All South Asia  74  70  65  57  
      
Share of GDP       
Pakistan  35  29  24  22  
All South Asia  43  36  29  21  
      
Share of exports       
Pakistan  53  38  30   12
All South Asia  46  40  26  13  
 
 








 Area  Area Yield Yield Production  Production
  (m. ha)  (% growth)
a (tons/ha) (% growth) (m. tons)  (% growth)
            
Wheat  8,292  0.19 2.52 2.19     20,937   2.39
Rice
d 2,534  1.33 2.03 1.92      5,140   3.28
 Basmati  1,539  2.51 1.65 3.60      2,538   6.20
 Other Rice  951  -0.52 2.52 1.45      2,398   0.93
Maize  984  1.01 2.80 4.74      2,751   5.80
Other foodgrains
b 850  -1.37 0.60 0.55        514   -0.68
Gram  1,047  -0.38 0.64 2.08        669   1.70
Sugarcane  982  0.71 49.19 0.92     48,325   1.64
Oilseeds  315  -0.84 0.74 0.80        234   0.22
Cotton  3,093  0.77 0.67 0.79      2,086   1.56
Tobacco  51  -0.09 2.01 1.05        102   0.96
Other crops
c 4,506 -0.66 n.ap.   n.ap.   n.ap.    n.ap.  
         
Total 22,653  0.15 n.ap.   n.ap.  n.ap.    n.ap.  
 
a Growth rates are average annual growth rates, 1990-91 to 2005-06. 
b Other foodgrains consist of bajra, jowar and barley. Oilseeds include rapeseed, mustard and 
sesamum.  
c Other crops include fruits, vegetables and all other crops. 
2005/06 data are preliminary.  
d Basmati and other rice figures are for data in 2004-05. 
 
Source: Calculated from Pakistan Economic Survey, 2005-06 (Tables 2.1 and 2.4). Table 3: Wheat production and trade, Pakistan, 1972 to 2005
a 
 
   Domestic   Net Net Net  inject./ Closing
Consumption Year  Production  Imports
b Exports procurement  Releases injections
c availability avail. stocks
 
  ('000 tons)  ('000 tons) ('000 tons) (‘000 tons) (‘000 tons)  (‘000 tons) ('000 tons) (percent) ('000 tons)
           
1972-79       8,223        1,188          0        1,452       2,456        1,004       8,405  12        225 
1980-89      12,167          944  0        3,534       3,925          391      11,341  3      1,290 
1990-99      16,305        2,418          0        3,655       5,752        2,097      16,771  12        787 
2000-05      19,771          326         578       4,580       4,124         -456     17,504  -3      1,337 
    
    2001-02      20,051          174         606       6,308       4,457        -1,851     16,195  -12      2,193 
    2003-04      18,970          537         752       3,645       4,574          929      18,002  52        509 
    2005      21,612           0   0      3,930       2,107        -1,823     18,627  -10      2,110 
a Years shown are fiscal years with production data from previous fiscal year. 
b Imports shown are government imports.  
c Net injections Includes estimated 1.0 million tons of private imports in 2005. 
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey (various years) and authors’ calculations. 30
 Table 4: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, Pakistan, 1962 to 2005 
(percent) 
   1962-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
      
Exportables
 a -33.3 -35.3 -20.1 -33.5 -29.1 -32.1 -16.7 -4.4  -6.9 
Rice (Basmati)  -51.0 -41.1 -37.3 -46.6 -49.5 -56.2 -17.9 -1.7 -25.3 
Rice (IRRI)  -42.8 -46.0 -18.8 -33.8 -24.6 -20.2 -0.5 8.1  12.5 
Cotton  -18.8 -17.5 -6.3 -5.1 3.1 -6.1 -19.9 -7.9 7.0 
            
Import-competing products
 a 9.2 45.0 19.2 -4.3 -1.9 5.4 -7.9 -1.9  3.4 
Wheat
 b -13.2 11.4 -16.2 -21.2 -22.3 -21.7 -27.1 -20.2 -13.9 
Maize 
c -19.9 -9.8 -19.4 -13.0 -5.9 1.2 -2.2 -1.9  -10.6 
Sugar 
c 137.0 234.2 113.4 33.6 72.4 123.7 52.1 54.3 86.5 
Milk 
c n.a.  70.4 123.8 54.6 47.5 54.5 25.4 16.9 19.7 
            
Total of covered products 
a -1.0 21.7 9.3 -11.8 -9.3 -5.9 -10.2 -2.6  1.0 
Dispersion of covered products 
d   62.1 105.6 74.5 43.2 49.6 65.2 32.2 27.7 39.5 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  69 70 74 72 69 68 66 68 71 
c Rice, sugar, milk and maize nominal rates of protection calculated at the wholesale market level. All other rates are calculated at farm gate. 
 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
 




d Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Table 5: Cotton production and trade, Pakistan, 1960 to 2005
a 
 
(‘000 tons and percent)
 
 




 Net exports as 
% of prod’n
1960-69 427 114 307  27
1970-79 584 132 447  21
1980-89 1068 408 616  36
1990-99 1627 96 1487  5
2000-05 1925 -205 2108  -11
a Data shown are for the next cotton marketing year, e.g. cotton harvest of October-
December 2004 is shown as 2005. 
Source: USDA data from www.fas.usda.gov/psd/complete_files/default.asp.  32
Table 6: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, Pakistan, 1962 to 2005 
(percent) 
   1962-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
Covered agric products
a -1.0 21.7 9.3 -11.8 -9.3 -5.9 -10.2 -2.6 1.0 
Non-covered agric products   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
All agricultural products
a -0.7 15.3 6.8 -8.5 -6.4 -4.0 -6.9 -1.6 0.8 
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
b -0.7 15.3 6.8 -8.5 -6.4 -4.0 -6.9 -1.6 0.8 
Trade bias index 
c -0.38 -0.55 -0.27 -0.31 -0.28 -0.35 -0.10 -0.02 -0.09 
     
Assistance to just tradables:    
   All agricultural tradables  -1.0 21.7 9.3 -11.8 -9.3 -5.9 -10.2 -2.6  1.0 
   All non-agricultural tradables  174.9 224.5 146.7 44.0 48.3 45.1 39.3 27.0  14.5 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
d -63.8 -62.4 -55.9 -38.6 -38.6 -35.1 -35.2 -23.0 -11.9 
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions:
d    
  NRA, all agric. products  -3.6 1.4 -15.7 -15.7 -15.4 -6.6 -9.0 -3.7 -1.6 
  Agricultural trade bias index  -0.51 -0.55 -0.26 -0.31 -0.28 -0.35 -0.10 -0.02 -0.08 
  RRA   -69.6 -68.5 -67.2 -45.7 -47.4 -37.8 -37.5 -25.3 -14.7 
 
a NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
b NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and 
intermediate inputs divided by the total value of primary agricultural production at undistorted prices (%). 
c Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
 Appendix: Key quantity and price data, assumptions and sources 
 
Production volume data are from FAOSTAT for 1960 to 2003 and from Pakistan Economic 
Survey for 2003 to 2005. For “Rice IRRI”, “Rice Basmati” and “Seed Cotton” production 
volume data are from Hamid (1990) for 1968 to 1980 and from Agricultural Statistics of 
Pakistan for the remaining years.  
 
Export and import volume data are from FAOSTAT for 1960 to 2003 and from Pakistan 
Economic Survey for 2003 to 2005. For “Rice IRRI”, “Rice Basmati” and “Seed Cotton” export 
and import data are from Hamid (1990) for 1968 to 1980 and from Agricultural Statistics of 
Pakistan for the remaining years.  
 
Consumption data are from FAOSTAT for 1960 to 2003 and from Pakistan Economic Survey 
(2005/06) for 2003 to 2005. For “Rice IRRI”, “Rice Basmati” and “Seed Cotton” export and 
import data are from Hamid (1990) for 1968 to 1980. For “Rice Basmati” and Rice IRRI” with 
unavailable consumption data, consumption was calculated as:  
     Consumption = Production – Exports – 6 % of Production for Seeds and Wastage   
 
Wholesale product prices are from FAOSTAT, Pakistan Economic Survey, Malik (1994), 
Hamid (1990), APCom database and Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan. 
 
Farm-gate product prices are from Pakistan Economic Survey or calculated from wholesale 
product prices adjusted for marketing costs. Marketing costs are calculated using base-year 
marketing costs (Rs/kg) adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index. See Dorosh and 
Valdes (1990).   
 
Input prices for fertilizers are from the Pakistan Economic Survey.  
 
Border prices  
Fob prices are extracted from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Cif prices are  
calculated from Fob prices by adjusting for international shipping costs.  
 
Exchange rates 
Official exchange rates are from Dorosh and Valdes (1990), IMF International Financial 
Statistics and Pakistan Economic Survey.  
 
 
Example: methodology for estimating wheat NRA 
Numerous studies have estimated rates of protection for agricultural commodities in Pakistan. 
Results have varied depending on methodologies used, particularly relating to four key issues: 
reference world prices and quality adjustments; marketing margins; central wholesale market at 
which free trade imports or exports would compete with the domestically produced good; and the 
choice of the reference price (import parity, export parity or autarky price).  
The calculations for wheat essentially follow Dorosh and Valdès (1990) with regard to 
world prices and marketing margins, with marketing margins from the mid-1980s to 2005  
31
assumed to be constant in real rupees per ton. (These assumptions are similar to those of Nabi et 
al. (1990) for the 1960s through the mid-1980s. The marketing margin series also aligns 
relatively closely to APCOM estimates for 1990s through 2005.)  
The present study uses Karachi as the base market for import parity calculations. That is, 
it assumes that in the absence of government interventions, private sector imports would supply 
the Karachi wholesale market (in at least part of the year) and that Punjab would supplement 
local Sindh production in the Karachi market in other parts of the year. Thus import parity in 
wholesale markets in Punjab is calculated as the import parity price in Karachi less transport 
costs to Punjab. An alternative assumption (resulting in a higher border price and therefore more 
negative nominal rates of protection) is Lahore or another large city in Punjab as the base market 
for import parity calculations, assuming that private sector imports would reach the Lahore 
market in the absence of government interventions. In this case, the import parity price in the 
Punjab reference market is equal to the import parity price in Karachi plus transport costs.
31  
Calculations of the relevant reference price are further complicated because in many 
years domestic prices in Pakistan would likely lie between import and export parity in the 
absence of government interventions. Thus, in these years, calculations based on import parity 
would tend to understate the nominal rate of assistance and calculations based on export parity 
would tend to overstate the NRA (Byerlee and Morris 1993). To correct for this problem, we use 
an estimated autarky (no trade) price as the reference price in years when the autarky price is 
below import parity. Autarky prices are estimated using two alternative sets of own-price 
elasticities of supply and demand. 
 
 
List of data sources 
Anderson, K., M. Kurzweil, W. Martin, D. Sandri and E. Valenzuela (2008), “Methodology for 
Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives”, Agricultural Distortions Research 
Project Working Paper 02, World Bank, Washington DC, revised January. Posted at 
wwwr.worldbank.org/agdistortions 
 
Dorosh, P. and A. Valdès (1990), Effect of Exchange Rate and Trade Policies on Agriculture in 
Pakistan, Research Report 84, Washington DC: International Food Policy Research 
Institute 
 
FAOSTAT (2006), Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics Databases. Available at: 
//faostat.fao.org. Accessed 1 September 2006. 
 
Government of Pakistan (2006 and earlier years), Pakistan Economic Survey, Islamabad 
Ministry of Finance. http://www.finance.gov.pk. 
 
Government of Pakistan (2006 and earlier years), Pakistan Statistical Yearbook, Islamabad: 
Federal Bureau of Statistics. 
 
                                                 
 
31 Earlier studies by Hamid, Nabi and Nasim (1990) and Dorosh and Valdès (1990) assume a central market (in 
terms of price formation) in Punjab rather than Karachi.   
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Government of Pakistan (2006 and earlier years), Pakistan Agricultural Statistics, Islamabad:     
             Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock.  
 
Government of Pakistan (2006 and earlier years), Pakistan Price Statistics, Islamabad:     
             Agricultural Price Commission (APCom).  
 
Hamid, N., I. Nabi and A. Nasim (1990), Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing 
Policies in Pakistan, Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
IMF (2006 and earlier years), International Financial Statistics, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund (annual). 
 
Malik S., S. Aftab and N. Sultana (1994), Pakistan’s Economic Performance 1947 to 1993: A 
Descriptive Analysis, Lahore: Sure Publishers.   
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Appendix Table A1: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, Pakistan, 1962 to 2005 
(percent) 
   Cotton Maize  Milk  Rice Sugar Wheat 
All 
covered  
1962  -22 -17  na -52 193  -7  7 
1963  -17 -16  na -42 191 -16  6 
1964  -18 -27  na -45  27 -17 -16 
1965  -3  -14 63  -42 84  6 15 
1966  -19 -26  63 -42 266 -11  17 
1967  -24 -4 60  -53  228 31 24 
1968  -19  6 81  -53  296 18 22 
1969  -23  -11 85  -31  296 12 29 
1970  -11 -11 140 -14 199  19  45 
1971  9 -21 143  2 140  19  47 
1972  1  19 241  6 192  7  42 
1973  -8 -41  26 -62  11 -69 -48 
1974  -22 -44  70 -68  25 -57 -38 
1975  -2 -11  67 -59 -35 -14 -19 
1976  -8 -24  18 -46 -18 -13 -15 
1977  -40 -32  38 -20  26 -26 -11 
1978  2 -8 43  -36 92  -23 -4 
1979  22  9 108 -44 102 -29 -11 
1980  -8 -14  59 -48  63 -36 -20 
1981  -17 -19  68 -46 -14 -30 -22 
1982  32 18 47  -34 61 -2  7 
1983  -5  5  14 -34 123 -21  -8 
1984  14 -20  49 -34 129 -23  -4 
1985  -20 -20  46 -42 178 -18  -6 
1986  4 -22  43 -51 155 -15  -5 
1987  24 -10  45 -40 115 -24  -1 
1988  -18 43 78  -40  124  -18  0 
1989  -20 14 59  -47 45  -33  -16 
1990  -43 -23  15 -46  21 -46 -32 
1991  -31 -9 22 -9 21  -26  -13 
1992  -17 15 22 -5 78  -17 -2 
1993  -1 11 44  3 85  -23  0 
1994  -8 -6 24 -3 56  -23 -4 
1995  -18 3  25 1  33  -19  -5 
1996  -13 2  24 2  43  -32  -7 
1997  -6 -21  1  -2  75 -35 -14 
1998  -4 0 9 9  51  -13 1 
1999  1  7 25 -1 70 -2 12 
2000  17 8  26  -15  145 9  17 
2001  5 -15  14 -11 107 -15  1 
2002  18 -17  4 -13  62 -27  -7 
2003  -2 -12  44 -13  82 -29  -2 
2004  3 -15  18 -18  51 -13  -1 
2005  0 -13  13 -21  73  -9  -2 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet.   
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Appendix Table A2: Nominal rates of assistance to all tradable agricultural industries and non-
agricultural industries, and relative rate of assistance,
a Pakistan, 1962 to 2005 (percent)
 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 














1962 -4  11 0  5  -36 20  7  164  -59 
1963 -5  11 0  4  -27 15  6  175  -61 
1964 -4  -13 0  -11  -36  -8  -16  185  -71 
1965 -1  17  0  11 -30  31 15 227  -65 
1966 -1  18  0  12 -33  38 17 199  -61 
1967 -2  26  0  17 -43  53 24 214  -61 
1968 -5  28  0  16 -43  48 22 232  -63 
1969 -1  31  0  22 -28  55 29 250  -63 
1970 -2  47  0  33 -13  64 45 236  -57 
1971 -6  53 0  35 5 59  47  261  -59 
1972 -13  54 0  30 3 56  42  153  -44 
1973 5 -54 0  -36  -43 -49  -48  46  -65 
1974 7 -45 0  -29  -53 -33  -38  32  -53 
1975 7 -26 0  -14  -46  -8  -19  29  -37 
1976 5 -20 0  -11  -35  -9  -15  32  -35 
1977 2 -13 0 -8  -29  -6  -11  37  -35 
1978 3  -7 0 -3  -25  3  -4  43  -33 
1979 5 -16 0 -7  -32  -2  -11  54  -42 
1980 4 -24 0  -14  -37 -14  -20  51  -47 
1981 5 -27 0  -15  -38 -16  -22  50  -48 
1982 4  3 0  5  -20 18  7  49  -28 
1983 2 -10 0 -5  -26  -1  -8  39  -34 
1984 2  -5 0 -2  -24  4  -4  43  -33 
1985 4 -10 0 -4  -35  6  -6  37  -32 
1986 3  -8 0 -3  -35  7  -5  33  -29 
1987 2  -4 0 -1  -22  6  -1  32  -26 
1988 3  -3 0  0  -31 16  0  38  -28 
1989 3 -19 0  -11  -37  -8  -16  37  -39 
1990 2 -34 0  -22  -45 -28  -32  35  -50 
1991 2 -15 0 -9  -22 -10  -13  34  -35 
1992 3  -5 0 -1  -12  2  -2  30  -24 
1993 2  -2 0  0 1  0  0  30  -23 
1994 2  -6 0 -3  -5  -4  -4  30  -26 
1995 2  -7 0 -3  -12  -3  -5  25  -24 
1996 3 -10 0 -5  -7  -7  -7  23  -24 
1997 2 -16 0  -10  -4 -16  -14  21  -29 
1998 2  -1 0  1 2  1  1  20  -16 
1999 1  12 0  9 0 16  12  19  -5 
2000 1  16 0  12  -5 23  17  26  -8 
2001 2  -1  0  1 -3  2 1 10  -8 
2002 1  -9 0 -5  -1  -9  -7  7  -13 
2003 1  -3 0 -2  -9  0  -2  11  -12 
2004 1  -2 0 -1  -10  2  -1  9  -9 
2005 2  -4 0 -1  -14  2  -2  8  -9 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet.  
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Appendix Table A3: Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products, 
Pakistan, 1962 to 2005    (percent) 
   Cotton Maize  Milk  Rice Sugar Wheat 
Non-
covered  
1962  9 4  na 8 7  42  31 
1963  8 4  na 6 8  43  31 
1964  7  4 na 14 11 34 31 
1965  6  3 12 12  8 28 31 
1966  7  3 14 12  5 27 31 
1967  7  5 12 14  4 27 30 
1968  6  3 10 14  3 33 30 
1969  8  3 12 15  5 31 27 
1970  8  3 10 11  7 35 26 
1971  8 4  12 9 9  34  26 
1972  10 3 7 9 5  39  27 
1973  4 2 7 8 6  47  25 
1974  7 2 6  14 6  40  26 
1975  4  2  7 16 13 30 27 
1976  4  2 11 12 13 30 28 
1977  7  3 11 10  9 34 27 
1978  5  2 10 13  6 35 29 
1979  4 2 5  16 4  39  30 
1980  5 2 6  14 5  38  30 
1981  5  2  5 13 12 32 31 
1982  4 2 8  16 8  30  31 
1983  5 2 9  13 4  34  31 
1984  4 2 8  14 5  33  33 
1985  6 2 9  14 3  33  33 
1986  5 2 9  14 3  33  33 
1987  5  2 10 13  6 32 32 
1988  10 2 9  14 4  31  30 
1989  7 2 8  12 5  34  32 
1990  9 2 9  10 5  33  33 
1991  11 2  11 7 6  33  29 
1992  11 2  11 6 4  31  35 
1993  7 2  10 6 4  35  36 
1994  7 2  12 7 5  31  36 
1995  11 2  10 5 5  30  36 
1996  9 2  16 5 4  29  36 
1997  7 2  19 6 3  32  30 
1998  6 2  19 5 6  31  30 
1999  7 2  20 9 6  28  29 
2000  5  2 20 11  3 31 27 
2001  7 2  19 7 3  33  28 
2002  5 2  19 8 5  32  29 
2003  6  2 14 10  5 34 30 
2004  7  2 16 11  5 30 30 
2005  6  3 16 11  3 31 30 
a At farmgate undistorted prices.    Source: Authors’ spreadsheet.  
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Appendix Table A4: Exchange rates, Pakistan, 1962 to 2005 
(Rs/US dollar) 















using the Dorosh 
and Valdes (1990) 
methodology
c
1962  4.8  8.2  0.5  n.a. 7.3 9.5 
1963  4.8  7.6  0.5  n.a. 6.9 9.9 
1964 4.8  8.6  0.5  n.a.  7.6  11.0 
1965 4.8  8.0  0.5  n.a.  7.2  10.3 
1966 4.8  7.8  0.5  n.a.  7.1  10.5 
1967 4.8  8.7  0.5  n.a.  7.7  11.0 
1968 4.8  9.0  0.5  n.a.  7.9  11.6 
1969 4.8 10.3  0.5  n.a.  9.0  11.2 
1970 4.8 10.6  0.5  n.a.  9.1  12.4 
1971  5.6  17.5  0.5  n.a. 14.5 12.3 
1972  10.6  13.7  0.5  n.a. 12.9 13.8 
1973  9.9  11.3  0.5  n.a. 10.9 11.0 
1974  9.9  12.1  0.5  n.a. 11.5 11.0 
1975  9.9  11.6  0.5  n.a. 11.1 13.1 
1976  9.9  11.2  0.5  n.a. 10.9 13.4 
1977  9.9  13.2  0.5  n.a. 12.4 13.0 
1978  9.9  13.7  0.5  n.a. 12.7 12.4 
1979  9.9  12.3  0.5  n.a. 11.7 12.3 
1980  9.9  12.6  0.5  n.a. 11.9 12.7 
1981  10.6  14.9  0.5  n.a. 13.8 13.1 
1982  12.7  15.8  0.5  n.a. 15.0 15.4 
1983  13.5  17.5  0.5  n.a. 16.5 17.0 
1984  15.2  16.9  0.5  n.a. 16.4 18.2 
1985  16.1  15.9  0.5  n.a. 16.0 20.2 
1986  17.2  17.3  0.5  n.a. 17.3 20.7 
1987  17.6  20.9  0.5  n.a. 20.0 20.8 
1988  19.2  21.1  0.5  n.a. 20.6 22.5 
1989  21.4  21.3  0.5  n.a. 21.3 25.4 
1990  22.4  24.1  0.5  n.a. 23.6 26.0 
1991  24.8  26.2  0.5  n.a. 25.8 28.7 
1992  26.0  28.3  0.5  n.a. 27.7 29.3 
1993  30.2  32.7  0.5  n.a. 32.1 34.3 
1994  30.9  33.4  0.5  n.a. 30.9 35.0 
1995  33.6  36.0  0.5  n.a. 33.6 37.7 
1996  39.0  41.3  0.5  n.a. 40.7 43.3 
1997  43.2  45.7  0.5  n.a. 45.1 47.6 
1998  46.8  52.0  0.5  n.a. 50.7 50.8 
1999  51.8  64.7  0.5  n.a. 61.5 55.5 
2000  58.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 58.4 62.2 
2001  61.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 61.4 64.3 
2002  58.5  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 58.5 61.4 
2003  57.6  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 57.6 61.7 
2004  59.4  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 59.4 63.6 
2005  59.8  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 59.8 64.1 
a  The proportion of foreign currency actually sold by all exporters at the parallel market rate. 
b  See Anderson et al. (2007) on the exchange rate methodology used in this study  
c  Equilibrium exchange rates using Dorosh and Valdes’ (1990) elasticities approach, not used in the present study. 
Source: Authors’ compilation using official data plus the methodologies cited in the above notes 